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PERLERA-ESCOBAR v. EXECUTIVE
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION: POLITICAL
ASYLUM AND THE QUESTION OF
NEUTRALITY
I. INTRODUCTION
In its recent decision denying asylum to an alien from El
Salvador,1 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Elev-
enth Circuit) has raised an important question about the limits
of the political asylum doctrine in the United States: namely,
whether neutrality constitutes a political opinion for the pur-
poses of political asylum. Under the Refugee Act of 1980 (Refu-
gee Act),2 aliens are entitled to asylum 3 if such aliens can
demonstrate that they possess a well-founded fear of persecution
in their native country, including persecution based upon their
1. Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office For Immigration (EOIR), 894 F.2d 1292 (11th
Cir. 1990).
2. Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§
1101(a)(42), 1157-1159, 1253(h), 1521-1524 (1982)) [hereinafter Refugee Act] (amending
the Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, §§ 101(a), 207, 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 166,
181, 214 (1952)) [hereinafter Immigration Act]). See Linda D. Bevis, Note, "Political
Opinions" of Refugees: Interpreting International Sources, 63 WASH. L. REV. 395 (1988)
[hereinafter Bevis].
3. Section 208(a) of the Refugee Act (as codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)), gives the
United States Attorney General the discretion to grant asylum to any alien who qualifies
as a refugee. A refugee is defined as: "any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion." This definition
appears in § 101(a) of the Refugee Act (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982)).
Section 243(h) of the Refugee Act (codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)), requires the Attorney
General to withhold the deportation of any alien whose life or freedom would be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. See Jeffrey L. Romig, Note, Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A
Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United States, 47 U. PIrr. L. REV. 295 (1985) [herein-
after Romig].
Asylum differs from withholding of deportation in several respects. First, a success-
ful asylum applicant obtains a secure status, unlike an alien who is successful under
section 243(h) (withholding of deportation), who may be deported to his or her native
country if the likelihood of persecution subsides, or who may be deported to a country
where persecution is less likely. Second, a withholding of deportation hearing can be
conducted without a State Department advisory opinion, while an asylum hearing can-
not. Richard K. Preston, Asylum Adjudications: Do State Department Advisory Opin-
ions Violate Refugees' Rights and U.S. International Obligations?, 45 MD. L. REV. 91,
106 (1986) [hereinafter Preston]. Finally, the standard of proof is higher in withholding
of deportation cases than in asylum cases because withholding is mandatory for qualified
applicants, whereas asylum is discretionary. See infra note 4.
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political opinions.4
In Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office For Immigration, the
court limits the scope of asylum relief based on persecution for
political opinion by holding that neutrality does not constitute a
political opinion for the purposes of political asylum proceed-
ings.5 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit will deny relief to aliens who
claim to fear persecution for their political opinions if such
aliens have never articulated a political opinion other than one
of neutrality." As a result, any aliens who seek asylum in the
Eleventh Circuit based on fear of political persecution must
demonstrate both that their fear is well-founded and that they
have a political opinion other than that of political neutrality.7
The question of whether neutrality constitutes a political
opinion for the purposes of asylum is one of first impression in
the Eleventh Circuit. In Perlera-Escobar, the Eleventh Circuit
denied asylum to a native of El Salvador who had once been
affiliated with a guerrilla group but who subsequently claimed to
be neutral in the Salvadoran civil war.8 In its decision, the court
specifically noted that the Eleventh Circuit has "not adopted"
the position of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(Ninth Circuit), which has held that neutrality does constitute a
political opinion for the purposes of political asylum.9
Perlera-Escobar is an important decision because an enor-
mous number of aliens illegally enter this country each year flee-
ing from countries whose state-of-affairs is both unstable and
very dangerous.10 Some of these aliens, including Mr. Escobar,
4. The standard of proof is higher for withholding of deportation than for asylum.
An applicant for asylum must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, which
requirement can, under some circumstances, be met with as little as a 10% chance of
persecution. An applicant for withholding of deportation, on the other hand, must
demonstrate a clear probability of persecution. In other words, he or she must demon-
strate that persecution is more likely than not to occur. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (definition of sufficient evidence to meet burden of proof). For an
in-depth, pre-Cardoza-Fonseca, analysis of the burden of proof issue, see Barry
Sautman, The Meaning of "Well-Founded Fear of Persecution" in United States Asy-
lum Law and in International Law, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 483 (1986) [hereinafter
Sautman].
5. 894 F.2d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 1990). See infra note 149, regarding the definition
of neutrality.
6. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1298.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1293-94.
9. Id. at 1297 n.4.
10. The number of applications for asylum filed each year far exceeds the original
expectations of the Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS). After the Refugee
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are convicted of felonies in the United States and thus do not
merit asylum here. However, many other aliens, who are not
criminals, may be able to demonstrate that they are victims of
persecution resulting from a civil war in which they are neutral.
The decision in Perlera-Escobar that neutrality does not consti-
tute a political opinion means almost certain deportation for
such people.
In reaching its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit expressed
doubt as to whether the courts are qualified to determine what
constitutes a political opinion.1 Historically, the United States
asylum policy has been affected by its foreign policy needs at a
given time. 2 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit has suggested that
perhaps determination of what constitutes a political opinion is
an exercise that is outside the competence of the judiciary and
would best be left to the "political" branches of government.'
This Comment will address several aspects of Perlera-Esco-
bar. Part IV will argue that the courts are well qualified to de-
termine what constitutes a political opinion for the purposes of
political asylum. Part V will argue that the Eleventh Circuit was
incorrect in determining that neutrality does not constitute a
political opinion for the purposes of political asylum. It will also
argue that the Ninth Circuit is correct in requiring that an
alien's opinion of neutrality must have been articulated in his or
her native country, because this ensures that the alien's neutral-
ity is the actual basis for the persecution. Additionally, Part V
will recommend that the statutory grant of discretion should be
exercised to deny asylum to any alien who is convicted of a fel-
ony, despite the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution.
Finally, Part VI will argue that the Eleventh Circuit was incor-
rect in concluding that the guerrillas did not impute an "incor-
rect" political opinion to Mr. Escobar.
II. BACKGROUND
Even though persecution on account of political opinion is a
Act was passed, INS estimated that only 5,000 applications would be filed each year.
Instead, 16 months after the Refugee Act took effect, 53,000 applications had been filed.
In 1985 alone, over 16,622 applications were filed. By the end of 1985, 126,000 other
applications were still pending. Preston, supra note 3, at 91-93. Thus, it is clear that the
standards developed by the courts for asylum adjudication are very important.
11. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1299.
12. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
13. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1299.
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statutory basis for asylum, there is currently no universally ac-
cepted definition of political opinion for asylum purposes in the
United States. In enacting the Refugee Act, one of Congress'
main purposes was to conform United States refugee law to the
United Nations 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees,14 to which the United States acceded in 1968.15 The Con-
gressional definition of refugee is therefore virtually identical to
that developed by the United Nations."6 In pertinent part the
Refugee Act defines a refugee as someone who has fled his or her
home country "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic-
ular social group, or political opinion ....
Unfortunately, the Refugee Act does not define what consti-
tutes a political opinion for the purposes of asylum. As a result,
the courts that have encountered this issue have had to formu-
late their own definition. The courts have been aided in asylum
adjudication by the 1979 publication of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Crite-
ria for Determining Refugee Status (Handbook). 8 However,
since the Handbook does not explicitly define the term "political
14. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol), Jan.
31, 1967, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
15. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987); Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d
1227 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984).
16. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 424.
17. See supra note 3 for the entire definition of refugee.
18. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Sept. 1979) [hereinafter
Handbook]. The Handbook was published in 1979 as a guide to the governments that
acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention or 1967 Protocol in determining refugee status.
For its analysis of the 1967 Protocol definition of a refugee, it relies on the experience of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which includes literature about
refugees and current knowledge of national practices regarding refugees. See Bevis,
supra note 2, at 399. Thus, the Handbook offers further definition to refugee status
based on persecution for political opinion.
According to the Handbook, while persecution for political opinion implies that an
alien holds an opinion that either has been expressed or has come to the attention of the
authorities, there may be situations in which the alien has not expressed his or her opin-
ions. Handbook at n.82. An alien is not required to show that the persecuting parties in
his or her home country knew of his or her opinions. Id. at n.83. The mere fact of refus-
ing to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her government, or of refusing to
return, might reveal the alien's true state of mind and give rise to an inference of fear of
persecution. Id.
While the Handbook does not have the force of law and is not a binding authority,
the Supreme Court has recognized its usefulness as a guide in construing the 1967 Proto-
col to which Congress has attempted to conform. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
439 n.22.
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opinion," the courts have reached differing conclusions. Thus, a
neutral alien's chances of receiving asylum depends as much on
which circuit hears the case as on the probability of persecution.
The Ninth Circuit has concluded that neutrality constitutes
a valid political opinion for political asylum purposes. 9 This is
an important decision because a large majority of the applica-
tions for asylum are decided in the Ninth Circuit.20 The court
first reached this conclusion in 1984 in Bolanos-Hernandez v.
INS.2 In Bolanos-Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit held that
"choosing to remain neutral is no less a political decision than is
choosing to affiliate with a particular faction. . . . Just as a na-
tion's decision to remain neutral is a political one, so is an
individual's."22
In Bolanos-Hernandez, the petitioner had severed his ties
to right-wing organizations in El Salvador, and had subsequently
refused to join the guerrillas despite their threats to his life.23
Bolanos-Hernandez testified that he desired to "remain neutral
and not be affiliated with any particular group. "24
After recognizing that Bolanos-Hernandez had a sufficient
reason to fear harm, the Ninth Circuit turned to the issue of
whether such harm would be on account of Bolanos' position of
neutrality and whether this would amount to persecution on ac-
count of political opinion.25 In concluding that Bolanos's neu-
trality was a political opinion for which he would be persecuted,
the court stated that, "[w]hen a person is aware of contending
political forces and affirmatively chooses not to join any faction,
that choice is a political one."26 The court added that requiring
someone to identify with one of two dominant factions in order
to possess a political opinion, when many people might be op-
19. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 1984). See also
Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988); Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.
1987).
20. A WESTLAW search revealed 38 recent asylum cases in which the political
opinion question was addressed. Twenty-seven of these cases were reviewed in the Ninth
Circuit. There is no immediately apparent reason for this practice, since both the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit are as
proximate as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to Latin America and the
Caribbean.
21. 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984), amended, March 1, 1985.
22. Id. at 1324, 1325.
23. Id. at 1318.
24. Id. at 1319.
25. Id. at 1324.
26. Id. at 1325.
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posed to the policies of both groups, would defeat one of the
main objectives of the Refugee Act, which is protect anyone who
suffers from persecution, regardless of their ideology. 7
The Ninth Circuit's position that neutrality is a valid politi-
cal opinion has continued to evolve in the years following Bola-
nos-Hernandez.2s The Ninth Circuit now requires aliens to
demonstrate that they have affirmatively decided to remain neu-
tral, and that this position has been articulated in some
manner.
29
The position of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
(First Circuit) is that in appropriate circumstances, neutrality
may fall within the scope of political opinion under the Refugee
Act.30 In order to fall within the statute's terms, the alien must
demonstrate that a reasonable person would fear one of the fol-
lowing: (1) that a group with the power to persecute the alien
intends to do so specifically because the group dislikes neutrals;
(2) that such a group intends to persecute the alien for not ac-
cepting its political point of view; or (3) that one or more such
groups intend to persecute the alien because each (incorrectly)
thinks the alien holds the political views of the other side.
Realistically, the chances are slim that the First Circuit will
grant asylum to an alien whose fear of persecution is based on a
position of neutrality. On its face, the test developed by the
First Circuit appears to be inclined toward granting asylum to
neutrals who can establish a well-founded fear of persecution
based on their neutrality. However, while recognizing that neu-
27. Id.
28. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985) ("irrelevant
whether a victim's political view is neutrality. . . or disapproval of the acts or opinions
of the [persecutor]"); Arteaga v. INS, 759 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985) (refugee not
required to prove an allegiance to a particular political faction in order to establish a
political opinion); Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1413-14 (9th Cir. 1985) (alien's con-
duct may reflect his or her neutral convictions and articulate a political opinion); Vides-
Vides v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988) (resistance by Salvadoran to guerrilla recruit-
ment expressed unwillingness to support the guerrilla cause and the adoption of a neu-
tral position toward both sides in the Salvadoran civil war); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902
F.2d 717, 728 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[a]n expression of political neutrality is no less an expres-
sion of political opinion than is the decision to affiliate with an organized political
faction.")
29. Also, that he or she has received a threat or would be singled out for persecution
because of the opinion of neutrality. See supra note 19.
30. Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990).
31. Id. The First Circuit further requires, in accordance with the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) requirements, that the alien has articulated or affirmatively made a
decision to remain neutral. Umanzor-Alvarado v. INS, 896 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1990).
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trality may constitute a political opinion in some situations, the
First Circuit has also indicated that it will accord great respect
to the findings of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in
each case.32 The BIA has made it clear that it will not recognize
neutrality as a political opinion in cases outside the Ninth Cir-
cuit.3 3 Thus, it is likely that an alien, even one with a stronger
case than Mr. Escobar, has little hope of receiving asylum in the
First Circuit based on a fear of persecution on account of politi-
cal neutrality.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Cir-
cuit) has not expressed a definite opinion on whether neutrality
constitutes a political opinion. However, two recent cases have
indicated that the Fourth Circuit is reluctant to grant asylum to
an alien who fears persecution based solely on a position of po-
litical neutrality. 4
There are several problems which face the courts. First,
while there may be situations in which it is possible for a person
to exist as a political neutral, this will not be true in all cases. In
situations such as that in El Salvador, it may be impossible to
exist as a neutral since both sides are aggressively vying for civil-
ian support.3 Situations like that in El Salvador are especially
troubling because the civilian populations are bearing much of
the brunt of the fighting.36 In addressing such situations, the
Eleventh Circuit has expressed its concern whether "the politi-
cal implications underlying the alien's fear rise to the level of
'political opinion' within the meaning of the statute or whether
those conditions constitute the type of civil strife outside the in-
tended reach of the statute.' ' 37 In other words, the pertinent is-
sue is whether the harm the alien fears is the same as that which
everyone else in the country fears.
Even for courts that believe neutrality is a valid political
32. Umanzor-Alvarado, 896 F.2d at 14; Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d at 3.
33. The BIA has indicated that it will limit the applicability of Bolanos-Hernandez
to cases arising in the Ninth Circuit, at least in cases where the alien's opinion of neu-
trality was expressed during his or her deportation hearing in the United States. See
Brief for Respondent at 33, Perlera-Escobar v. EOIR, 894 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1990)
(No. 89-5064). See also Matter of Vigil, Int. Dec. 3050 at 6-7 (BIA March 17, 1988).
34. See Figeroa v. U.S. INS, 886 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1989); Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802
F.2d 1518 (4th Cir. 1986).
35. See Castaneda-Hernandez v. INS, 826 F.2d 1526, 1528 (6th Cir. 1987).
36. Between 1980 and 1985, government security forces and right-wing death squads
alone killed approximately 40,000 noncombatants. To this total must be added the un-
told number killed by the guerrillas. See Romig, supra note 3, at 300.
37. Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1987).
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opinion, there are other issues which must be addressed. For in-
stance, the courts must make clear what actions or words suffi-
ciently articulate the alien's neutrality. Additionally, there will
be situations where either or both sides will impute an incorrect
political opinion to neutral aliens and will attempt to persecute
them for it. Finally, if neutrality is a legitimate political opinion
for asylum purposes, the United States could find itself over-
whelmed by people fleeing their countries' problems, including
some, like Mr. Escobar, who will seek asylum in the United
States despite committing serious crimes here.
III. PERLERA-ESCOBAR V. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
A. Facts
Jose Adalberto Perlera-Escobar was a twenty-six year old
native of a small town in El Salvador.38 The civil war in El Sal-
vador reached Escobar around 1980 when a group of guerrillas
entered his town, seeking food and propagandizing.39 One of the
guerrillas was a childhood friend of Escobar's and asked him to
join them, but Escobar refused. 40 The guerrilla presence in the
town prompted the arrival of a paramilitary organization known
as the Esquadron de la Muerte (Death Squad).41 The Death
Squad commonly extorted money from the townspeople and
branded anyone who was uncooperative as a guerrilla
collaborator.42
In February, 1983, a different death squad attacked and
wounded several of Escobar's relatives while he was out of
town.43 Escobar's relatives moved to San Salvador but Escobar
38. Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office For Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1293, 1294
(11th Cir. 1990).
39. Petitioner's Brief-in-Chief at 5, Perlera-Escobar (No. 89-5064).
40. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1293-94.
41. Id. at 1294.
42. Id. Escobar testified that the death squads killed many people in the town in-
cluding both his cousin and his step-father's nephew, but the local army commander
never took any action. See Petitioner's Brief-in-Chief at 6, Perlera-Escobar (No. 89-
5064).
43. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1294. Escobar's grandparents and aunt had en-
countered problems with a death squad from a nearby town. In order to resolve their
dispute, a deal was struck between Escobar's grandfather and the death squad, whereby
Escobar's 14 year old aunt was exchanged for a dog, a gun, and a woman who was given
to Escobar's uncle. However, the deal broke down in February 1983, leading the guerril-
las to attack Escobar's relatives. Id.
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decided to remain. 4 About two months later, members of the
same death squad returned to the town.45 After learning that Es-
cobar was related to the family whom they had attacked, a
member of the death squad told Escobar that the. death squad
would be looking for him in town.46
Fearful of being kidnapped, Escobar sought the help of the
childhood friend who had tried to recruit him for the guerrillas
on several previous occasions. This friend brought Escobar to a
guerrilla camp where he was forcibly trained and "incorporated"
into the guerrilla organization.48 While Escobar was with them,
the guerrillas executed two of their members who were accused
of trying to escape.49 Fearing for his life, Escobar fought with
the guerrillas against the government for nine months.5" During
that time his involvement with the guerrillas became known to
the government.5 '
In February, 1984, Escobar deserted the guerrillas and fled
to San Salvador.52 Soon after, he encountered two guerrillas who
told him that the guerrilla commander had issued orders for his
arrest.53 Additionally, Escobar testified that a cousin informed
him that Escobar was being sought by the death squad from his
home town.54
In response, Escobar fled El Salvador and within a year he
illegally entered the United States.5 5 Shortly thereafter, he was
informed by relatives that both the guerrillas and the death
squads were looking for him. 6
In February, 1987, Escobar was convicted of three third de-
gree felonies.5 Facing deportation, Escobar applied for asylum,
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. During one battle, his group was photographed by journalists. Soon after, an
army plane scattered leaflets over San Salvador with photos of the guerrillas, including a
picture of Escobar. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. After fleeing El Salvador, Escobar arrived in Mexico, where he stayed for ten
months and was granted safe haven. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1293. Escobar was convicted and sentenced in the Circuit Court of Gads-
den County, Florida, on two counts of burglary and one count of attempted burglary. At
19921
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claiming that he would be killed by either the military or the
guerrillas if he returned to El Salvador.5 His fear of the guerril-
las was based on his desertion and the fact that the guerrillas
were searching for him.5 9 Escobar also feared that the death
squad officer had forwarded his name to the military, and that
the military would in turn forward it to Salvadoran customs offi-
cials.60 Thus, Escobar feared that he would be arrested and
killed by the government if he returned to the airport in San
Salvador.6 '
Escobar testified that he was politically neutral, saying that
he did not "want to belong into [sic] the guerrilla, nor the army
because I don't believe it's a just cause when fighting against my
brothers." 2 At the deportation hearing, the Immigration Judge
(IJ) found Escobar to be deportable under sections 241(a)(2)
and 241(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 3 How-
ever, the IJ also concluded that Escobar, though politically neu-
tral, had a well-founded fear of persecution from both sides in
the Salvadoran civil war on account of an incorrectly imputed
political opinion. 4
The IJ concluded that the Salvadoran Government would
seek to persecute Escobar for the political opinion he demon-
strated by joining the guerrillas.6 5 The IJ further concluded that
the guerrillas would want to punish Escobar for deserting them
and to prevent him from revealing valuable secrets about
his deportation hearing, he admitted that he had entered the country without inspection
and that he had committed a crime involving moral turpitude, and was thus deportable.
Id. See § 241(a)(4), Immigration and Nationality Act (as codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)
- Crimes involving moral turpitude).
58. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1293, 1294.
59. Petitioner's Brief-in-Chief at 9, Perlera-Escobar (No. 89-5064).
60. Id. at 10.
61. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1294 n.1.
62. Id. at 1294.
63. Id. at 1294, 1295.
64. Id. at 1295. The Immigration Judge (IJ) also concluded that Escobar had
demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution based on membership in a particular
social group (the guerrillas). However, since the question of whether a former guerrilla is
a member of a particular social group for purposes of asylum or withholding of deporta-
tion was not presented to the BIA, the Eleventh Circuit determined that it did not have
jurisdiction to decide that question. Id. at 1295-96.
65. Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, In re: Jose Adalberto Perlera-
Escobar [hereinafter BIA Decision] at 2. The IJ concluded that the government would be
aware of Escobar's guerrilla activities since the residents of his small town knew that he
had joined the guerrillas. Thus, the IJ found that, if returned, Escobar could be in con-
stant danger of being jailed or summarily executed by the government or individual gov-
ernment sympathizers. Id.
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them.66
Despite these conclusions, the IJ exercised his discretion
and denied the application for asylum. 7 This decision was based
on Escobar's criminal record in the United States, his use of a
false social security card and an alias, his illegal entry into the
United States despite being granted safe haven in Mexico, and
the fact that Escobar only applied for asylum after being appre-
hended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)."5
However, the IJ granted Escobar's application for withholding of
deportation69 and the INS appealed to the BIA.
After carefully reviewing the facts, the BIA concluded that
Escobar had not carried his burden of proof for asylum or with-
holding of deportation."° Turning first to his fear of the guerril-
las, the BIA concluded that Escobar failed to demonstrate a
well-founded fear of persecution from the guerrillas based on his
political opinion."' The BIA relied on Escobar's testimony that
even though he claimed he was politically neutral he had never
"openly advocated" his neutrality and, thus, the guerrillas' moti-
vation for seeking Escobar would be to punish him for deserting,
not to persecute him for his political opinion.72
The BIA next determined that if Escobar were arrested by
the government it would not be on account of political opinion,
since, once again, he had never "openly advocated his neutral-
ity. 71 3 Thus, any retribution from a particular death squad could
not be on account of Escobar's political opinion. 4
66. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1295.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See discussion of distinction between asylum and withholding of deportation,
supra note 3.
70. BIA Decision, supra note 65, at 8, 12.
71. BIA Decision, supra note 65, at 11.
72. BIA Decision, supra note 65, at 9-10.
73. BIA Decision, supra note 65, at 11. The BIA also asserted that the government
of El Salvador, as a duly constituted and functioning government, has a legitimate and
internationally recognized right to punish anyone it determines is a guerrilla. Id.
74. BIA Decision, supra note 65, at 11. Additionally, the BIA clarified its position
regarding civil wars such as that in El Salvador. The BIA stated that while such conflicts
are undoubtedly brutal, "the harm that may result incidentally from behavior directed at
overthrowing or preventing the overthrow of a government, through acts of warfare and
other violence endemic to civil wars, is not persecution, even though such acts are in
furtherance of political goals." Id. at 12.
19921
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
B. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit denied Escobar's application for asy-
lum, concluding that he had not established a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of political opinion.
The Eleventh Circuit indicated that, as a threshold matter,
defining the scope of "political opinion" is a responsibility of the
"political" branches of government, stating that "[w]hat consti-
tutes political opinion under the Refugee Act is a political ques-
tion which the courts are not especially qualified to decide.""6 In
light of that belief, the Eleventh Circuit accorded a presumption
of correctness to the BIA's position that neutrality does not con-
stitute a political opinion for the purposes of political asylum.7
The court also noted that the Eleventh Circuit has "not
adopted" the Ninth Circuit's belief that political neutrality is a
political opinion for the purposes of the Refugee Act.78
The court denied Escobar's contention that his desertion
from the guerrillas was an articulation of a statutorily recognized
opinion of political neutrality and that he would be persecuted
for this opinion . 9 The court relied on the BIA's position that, in
the context of a civil war, a desire to remain neutral is not an
expression of a political opinion. 0 More particularly, the court
stated that any interest of the guerrillas in Escobar would not be
based on what he thinks or believes, but would be based on their
need to "preserve unity and order in their ranks and to ensure
the secrecy of their operations."'" Thus, the court found that the
BIA was reasonable in finding that the desire to discipline de-
serters is not persecution on account of political opinion within
the meaning of the statute.8 2
Additionally, the court concluded that Escobar had failed to
show that either the guerrillas or the government had imputed a
political opinion to him for which they would seek to persecute
75. Perlera-Escobar v. EOIR, 894 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1990). The Eleventh
Circuit also upheld the decision of the BIA to deny withholding of deportation. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1297 n.4. In doing so, the court noted the BIA's concern that adoption of
the Ninth Circuit's position would defeat the purpose of the asylum statute by creating a
"sinkhole that would swallow the rule." Id. at 1298.
79. Id. at 1298.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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him.8 3 Instead, any harm inflicted on Escobar by the government
would be based on their desire to prosecute him for being "a
traitor" and attacking the government, rather than on his politi-
cal opinion, imputed or not."4 Any harm inflicted by the guerril-
las would be a result of their need to maintain discipline in their
ranks by punishing deserters, as noted earlier.8 5
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit held that the BIA was reasona-
ble in concluding that neither the government nor the guerrillas
had any political interest in Escobar. As such, he had failed to
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
86political opinion.
IV. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
A. Background
In its decision in Perlera-Escobar, the Eleventh Circuit ex-
pressed doubt about the competence of the courts to determine
what constitutes a political opinion for asylum purposes.8 7 In so
doing, the court raised an important question about the adjudi-
cation of such applications: is the question of what constitutes a
political opinion under the Refugee Act one that is beyond the
competence of the courts and thus, better left to another branch
of government. Statutorily, there is no doubt that these cases
are within the courts' jurisdiction.88 Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit
has been the only circuit to express doubt about the ability of
the courts to decide what constitutes a political opinion.
Traditionally, aliens' chances of receiving refugee status in
the United States were dependent on their country or origin and
United States foreign policy at the time. 9 Because a refugee is,
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1299.
85. Id. at 1298. However, the court pointedly noted that this was based on the spe-
cific facts at hand, and that they did not "categorically hold that a former guerrilla may
never show persecution 'on account of... political opinion.'" Id. at 1299. It was simply
not the case for Escobar.
86. In its opinion, the court stated that it was explicitly declining to decide whether
"no opinion" constitutes an opinion under the Refugee Act, concluding that "even as-
suming it does, Escobar never openly articulated his position, nor has he shown that the
guerrillas pursued him because of his neutrality." Id. In so stating, the court incorrectly
substituted the phrase "no opinion" for "neutrality." The two are not the same. See
infra note 149 and accompanying text.
87. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1299.
88. See Immigration Act, supra note 2.
89. Romig, supra note 3, at 314. United States foreign policy needs at a given time
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by definition, a victim of persecution,"0 according someone refu-
gee status effectively accuses that person's native government of
engaging in persecution.91 Acceptance of large numbers of refu-
gees serves to magnify the extent of another state's misbehavior
while displaying one's own humanitarianism. 2 Thus, refugee
policy was traditionally a tool with which the United States
could further its foreign policy interests.93
It follows that the United States was reluctant to accord
refugee status to aliens from those states with whom the United
States was allied, or had friendly relations.94 The downside of
such a policy was that many deserving refugees found them-
selves denied asylum, victims of United States foreign policy
needs. 5
Ostensibly, the Refugee Act eradicated any geographical or
"political" limits to asylum.96 However, in the first five years af-
ter the Refugee Act was enacted, ninety-five percent of success-
ful asylum applicants were from Communist countries.9 7 Also,
the executive branch continues to place unequal geographically-
were served by Congress, which was responsible for establishing standards for asylum
eligibility. A revealing example is the language of the Immigration Act, which restricted
refugee status to persons fleeing persecution from communist or communist-dominated
countries or any Middle Eastern country. Through this policy, the United States could
proclaim its own humanitarianism while condemning its Cold War enemy, the Soviet
Union. Id.
90. See supra note 2.
91. Romig, supra note 3, at 314 n.117.
92. Romig, supra note 3, at 314 n.117.
93. Romig, supra note 3, at 314 n.117.
94. Romig, supra note 3, at 314 n.117.
95. Romig, supra note 3, at 314 n.117.
96. See supra note 3.
97. Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum, 99 HARV. L. REV.
450, 459 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Political Legitimacy]. In 1983, Russian, Ethiopian,
Afghan, and Romanian approval rates for asylum were 87%, 64%, 53%, and 44%, re-
spectively, compared to Pakistani, Filipino, Salvadoran, Haitian, and Guatemalan rates
of 12%, 11%, 3%, 2%, and 2% respectively. Sautman, supra note 4, at 484 n.4. One
report indicates that from 1980 through July 1983, 76 Salvadorans were granted asylum
and over 35,000 were deported. Note, Political Legitimacy, supra, at 459 n.67. Another
report indicates that in 1984, 328 Salvadorans were granted asylum, while 13,045 were
denied. Sautman, supra note 4, at 484 n.4. By 1989, little had changed for Latin Ameri-
cans. In fiscal 1989, Romanian, Russian, Chinese, and Ethiopian approval rates for asy-
lum were 90.9%, 81.6%, 80.9%, and 65.8%, respectively, compared to Haitian, Salvado-
ran, Guatemalan, and Honduran rates of 3.5%, 2.3%, 1.9%, and 1.3%, respectively.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, REASONABLE FEAR, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES
REFUGEE POLICY 18 (1990). Such a policy can have serious consequences in light of the
large numbers of people entering the United States from Central American and Carib-
bean countries, since reports have indicated that many unsuccessful applicants for asy-
lum have been returned to their deaths. Note, Political Legitimacy, supra, at 459.
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oriented ceilings on the number of overseas aliens who may re-
ceive refugee status.9 8 These ceilings serve foreign policy by lim-
iting the extent to which the United States is forced to recognize
that persecution exists in a country with which the United
States maintains friendly relations.9 9 At the same time, setting a
higher ceiling for refugees from "unfriendly" countries allows
the United States to publicize that such countries engage in per-
secution. 100 These factors suggest that foreign policy goals con-
tinue to play a role in asylum adjudication.
The question, then, is whether political concerns are so
prevalent in asylum applications based on persecution for politi-
cal opinion as to place them beyond the competence of the judi-
cial branch. Analysis of this question derives from the basic con-
stitutional concept of separation of powers. 10 1 Modern political
question analysis is based on the Supreme Court's 1962 decision
in Baker v. Carr,02 in which the Court emphasized the need to
separate the appropriate spheres of federal judicial power from
the appropriate spheres of federal executive and legislative
power.'03 In Baker, the Court articulated six factors, any one of
which may lead to dismissal of a case as a political question: (1)
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the is-
sues to a coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the
impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy de-
termination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; (4) the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing a lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
98. See Romig, supra note 3, at 315. The Overseas Admissions Program for 1985
placed a ceiling on refugee admissions from all of Latin America and the Caribbean at
3,000, while allotting 50,000 admissions to East Asia and 9,000 to Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union. Id.
99. Romig, supra note 3, at 315.
100. Romig, supra note 3, at 315.
101. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1983) [hereinafter C. WRIGHT]. The
political question doctrine goes as far back as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 164-66 (1803), in which Chief Justice Marshall refused to entertain political ques-
tions designated by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative branches of the
government. See C. WRIGHT, supra, at 75.
102. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
103. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 101, at 75.
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departments on one question."0 4
In subsequent years, the Court has found most issues to be
within the judicial sphere under the Baker standard. 10 Accord-
ingly, in light of Congressional delegation of such matters to the
courts,10 6 the adjudication of political asylum cases is also within
the scope of the judicial branch's competence.
B. Applying Baker to Perlera-Escobar
Application of the Baker political question test to Perlera-
Escobar reveals that the determination of what constitutes a po-
litical opinion for asylum purposes is properly within the adjudi-
catory authority of the judicial branch.
The most important factor in this analysis is the inclusion
by Congress of persecution on account of political opinion as one
of the five statutory bases for political asylum. 10 7 Such inclusion
indicates that Congress, in enacting the statute, does not believe
that political asylum standards are so essential to United States
foreign policy that they should be handled by the political
branches of the government. This position is consistent with the
purposes of the Refugee Act, which was specifically designed to
remove ideological bias from United States immigration law.10 8
By writing the statute so as to include persecution on ac-
count of political opinion, Congress has manifested its intent to
104. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 101, at 75-76.
105. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), where the Court held that the
House of Representatives had erred in refusing to seat Congressman-elect Adam Clayton
Powell, despite a specific provision in Article I, Section 5 of the United States Constitu-
tion that "Each House shall be the Judge of the. . . Qualifications of its own members."
The Court concluded that since it was conceded that Powell met the specified qualifica-
tions and was not excluded for failing to meet them, his exclusion on other grounds was
justiciable. C. WRIGHT, supra note 101, at 78. Indeed, one commentator has questioned
whether the political question doctrine even exists. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political
Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976). But see Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1
(1973), where the Supreme Court found a textual commitment to Congress of the power
to set standards by which the states are to train the militia, indicating that the political
question doctrine is not dead yet. C. WRIGHT, supra note 101, at 81.
106. See Refugee Act, supra note 2.
107. See Refugee Act, supra note 2.
108. See Note, Political Legitimacy, supra note 97, at 458. See also Preston, supra
note 3, at 100; Mark von Sternberg, Emerging Bases of "Persecution" in American Refu-
gee Law: Political Opinion and the Dilemma of Neutrality, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J.
1, 8 (1989) [hereinafter von Sternberg]; Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1325
(9th Cir. 1985). The legislative history of the Refugee Act indicates that it "reflects one
of the oldest themes in American history - welcoming homeless refugees to our shores.
It gives statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and humanita-
rian concerns." von Sternberg, supra, at 8.
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have such issues adjudicated in the courts. Logically, then, the
judicial branch cannot be said to have offended the political
branches of government when those branches have provided for
judicial review of administrative decisions which are arguably
political. 0 9 As one district court has noted, "one cannot be said
to have usurped that which one has been told to do.""' Further-
more, by having political asylum applications reviewed in the
courts, Congress has not ceded control of foreign policy;".' it has
simply recognized the ability of the courts to function as
factfinders and to adjudicate issues of domestic law." 2
None of the six factors enunciated in Baker are present in
judicial application of the statute recognizing a well-founded
fear of persecution for political opinion as a basis of asylum. The
fourth factor is satisfied since the courts will be fulfilling the
task assigned to them by the legislature. As such, there will be
no lack of respect for coordinate branches of government or any
departure from an already determined policy or political deci-
sion. Additionally, there is not likely to be any "embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question," 1 3 since decisions will necessarily be based on the
facts in a given case, and thus will warrant differing conclusions.
Thus, the sixth factor of the Baker test is also satisfied.
The first, third, and fifth factors of the Baker test are satis-
fied by the Congressional grant to the judiciary of the power to
adjudicate asylum claims. It is evident that this is not an area
requiring nonjudicial discretion or unquestioning adherence to a
previously established political decision. Indeed, adjudication of
asylum claims is in itself adherence to the decisions of the politi-
cal branches. Further, there is no problem with a textual consti-
109. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 472-73 (S.D. Fla. 1980),
aff'd as modified, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
110. Id. at 473.
111. As mentioned earlier, it is clear that through quotas and other measures, the
Executive and Legislative branches still exert considerable influence over the asylum
field. See supra notes 97 and 98.
112. Indeed, a persuasive argument could be made that failure to adjudicate politi-
cal opinion cases in the courts would reflect poorly on the motives of the United States
in enacting asylum laws. Such a failure would imply that the United States was more
interested in providing asylum in only those cases which serve its foreign policy needs
rather than in all cases in which refugees meet the statutory requirements. Such a prac-
tice would clearly violate the language and spirit of the Refugee Act. See Note, Political
Legitimacy, supra note 97, at 458.
113. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also supra note 102 and accompa-
nying text.
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tutional commitment of this issue to a coordinate political de-
partment. While there is nothing in the Constitution explicitly
designating which branch should determine the requirements for
asylum, it is not likely to be disputed that this power originates
outside the courts. However, Congress has only gone so far as to
include political opinion as a basis for statutory relief from per-
secution and has not defined it further." 4 Thus, Congress has
left the task of defining the term to the courts. If this is unsatis-
factory or unintentional, Congress has the ability to change the
statute.
The most complicated prong of the Baker test with respect
to asylum cases is the requirement of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving the issue. One might argue
that the courts are too detached from political situations to be
able to determine what constitutes a political opinion under the
Refugee Act. However, in deciding what constitutes a political
opinion, the courts would be acting in their usual roles as adju-
dicators and reviewers. They would be required to render an
opinion based on readily available facts about the conditions
and events in a given case.
In formulating a standard for assessing what constitutes a
political opinion in a given case, the courts should look first to
the general conditions in the alien's native country. This will en-
able the courts to determine whether a given opinion is political
in the context in which it exists.
The conditions under which a given alien exists are a pri-
mary factor in causing victims of persecution to forsake the pro-
tection of their homeland and to flee to a foreign country.1"0 Rel-
evant to each case are political, social, and economic factors such
as the structure of the government, judiciary and armed forces,
and the relation of these groups to an alien's life." 6 Also, an
alien's personal and family background and information about
his or her religious and work habits are relevant.1 7 Additionally,
reports compiled by concerned organizations such as the Law-
114. See supra note 3.
115. See Bevis, supra note 2, at 409.
116. Bevis, supra note 2, at 409. See also, Handbook, supra note 18, at n.41. While
the structure of the government, judiciary, and armed forces are political issues in many
respects, it is exactly this "political nature" which makes them essential considerations
in a court's determination of whether an alien's behavior in a given situation is politically
motivated.
117. Bevis, supra note 2, at 409.
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yers Committee for Human Rights and Amnesty International
might provide relevant information." 8
Concededly, information about the conditions in the alien's
native country is too general to be dispositive in any given case.
However, such information does help to place an asylum appli-
cation within its proper context and will place judges in a
stronger position from which to render a decision.
Once the court has examined the general conditions in the
alien's native country, it can determine whether a person's opin-
ion is political. Again, this would be best accomplished by view-
ing the alien's opinions within the context of the particular
country from which the alien has fled.119 While the term "polit-
ics" is often used to describe government activities, it can also
be applied more generally to human interaction in situations in-
volving control or influence over allocations of material goods
and spiritual values.120 Essentially, then, the court must deter-
mine whether the opinion expressed by the alien may be per-
ceived by the persecutor as a threat to the persecutor's ability to
control the outcome of a situation, thus "politicizing" the opin-
ion. 12 By examining the general situation in a country and the
details of the particular alien's everyday life, the courts are able
to work with a judicially manageable standard and to satisfy this
prong of the Baker test.
In sum, it is clear that there are political concerns involved
in applications for asylum for persecution based on political
opinion. However, the Supreme Court has stated that, "it is er-
ror to suppose that every case or controversy which touches for-
eign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. ' '11 2 Other courts
have indicated that the political question doctrine must have
flexibility when basic individual rights are involved and these
courts remain unconvinced that foreign policy concerns suffi-
ciently outweigh these rights in asylum cases. 123 In light of the
presence of manageable standards and congressional designation
of asylum cases to the courts, it is apparent that determining
118. Bevis, supra note 2, at 409.
119. Bevis, supra note 2, at 409.
120. Bevis, supra note 2, at 409.
121. In a case in which an alien has not openly expressed his or her opinion, or is
neutral, the court may encounter the need to develop standards for articulation. This
situation is treated in detail later in this Comment. See infra notes 146-62 and accompa-
nying text.
122. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
123. See Note, Political Legitimacy, supra note 97, at 468.
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what constitutes a political opinion under the Refugee Act is
within the competence of the courts.
V. NEUTRALITY AS A POLITICAL OPINION
In concluding that neutrality is not a political opinion for
the purposes of political asylum, the Eleventh Circuit has failed
to recognize that a thoughtful, affirmative position of neutrality
is as political as a choice to join a particular political faction.
Political opinions arise out of an awareness and understand-
ing of the political environment in which one exists. The devel-
opment of a political opinion requires individuals to examine
and consider their political environment, and to reach a decision
based on that examination. Whether one chooses to support or
reject the available political positions, the choice is still political.
As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, "[w]hen a person is aware
of contending political forces and affirmatively chooses not to
join any faction, that choice is a political one."' 24 The key word
is "affirmative", because it demonstrates that the choice was a
thoughtful and deliberate one rather than an indifferent one.
When confronted with limited choices, such as in El Salva-
dor, individuals may determine that they do not support the
aims or goals of the groups which seek support and thus may
refuse to become aligned with either group.115 This stance of
"neutrality" does not render a person's choice apolitical. 126
Rather, this stance is indeed a political one, because it is a con-
scious rejection of political doctrines of which he or she does not
approve.
Revolutionary situations often force people to make politi-
cal decisions because warring factions actively seek the support
of the civilian population. 12 7 Civil wars do not permit apathy
when they occur in small countries like El Salvador, where the
fighting permeates the entire country and causes heavy civilian
casualties. 28 Here, apolitical people are forced to make "politi-
cal" decisions about their lives. The contending forces are seek-
ing more than just ideological support, they demand physical
124. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1984), amended
March 1, 1985.
125. See, e.g., id. at 1325; Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407, 1413-14 (9th Cir. 1985).
126. See Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1324.
127. See, e.g., Del Valle, 776 F.2d at 1413 (civilian received three notes and phone
calls from Death Squad recruiters seeking his participation as an informant).
128. See supra note 36.
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support in the form of actual combat participation. 129
The argument that a refusal to join may be motivated not
by politics, but by a desire to avoid violence, is unconvincing.
Refusal to join a particular group is often countered with violent
retribution because the rejected group believes the person is
supporting the other side. 13 This assumption leads to many
cases where the rejected group persecutes someone for an incor-
rectly imputed political opinion, be it one of neutrality or one
that is contrary to the group's cause.' 3 '
When a neutral party is persecuted for refusing to support a
particular group, this constitutes persecution on account of po-
litical opinion, even if the person is not being persecuted be-
cause the persecutor specifically dislikes neutrals.1 2 Such perse-
cution is on account of political opinion because the victim's
politics, manifested in an unwillingness to support the persecu-
tor, is the motivation for the persecution. Even a sovereign gov-
ernment, which can legally conscript people, cannot force the
same people to render ideological support beyond compliance
with draft laws.' A neutral citizen may not agree with the gov-
ernment's politics and may refuse to express ideological or phys-
ical support beyond service in the army. If that person is perse-
cuted for not "fully" supporting the government, that
persecution is most definitely on account of political opinion.
Regarding situations like the one in El Salvador, it would be
illogical to state that individuals who choose to remain neutral
are excluded from the political arena because they are not al-
igned to a particular group or have not formed an alternative
group. 3 4 To deny asylum to victims of persecution merely be-
cause they have not joined a particular political faction would
thwart one of the main goals of the Refugee Act, which is to
protect all victims of persecution, regardless of their ideology. 35
As the Ninth Circuit has stated, "construing 'political opinion'
129. See von Sternberg, supra note 108, at 5-6 n.28.
130. Even if the rejected group does not believe the person is supporting the other
side, the rejected group may threaten the person with violence or death anyway. See,
e.g., Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1325 (guerrillas threatened civilian's life for not
joining them); Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1988) (civilian who resisted
recruitment by the guerrillas was told, "even if you don't come, we'll get you.").
131. See infra notes 163-88 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 163-88 and accompanying text.
133. See von Sternberg, supra note 108, at 29.
134. See Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1325.
135. Id.
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in so short-sighted and grudging a manner could result in limit-
ing the benefits under the ameliorative provisions of our immi-
gration laws to those who join one political extreme or another;
moderates who choose to sit out a battle would not qualify."13
In denying asylum to Escobar, the Eleventh Circuit is con-
struing the term "political opinion" in a narrow and short-
sighted manner. The Eleventh Circuit did not doubt that Esco-
bar had reason to fear harm if he returned to El Salvador. 137
Rather, the court concluded that he had not demonstrated that
this fear was on account of persecution for his political opin-
ion."8" The court expressed its concern that "to adopt Escobar's
position would allow the applicant to determine the scope of the
term 'political opinion' and, therefore, would entitle almost any-
one in a war-torn country to meet the statutory requirements for
a grant of asylum."'3 9
The Fourth Circuit has taken a similar position. In Cruz-
Lopez v. INS,140 the Fourth Circuit denied asylum to a neutral
Salvadoran who received a note from a guerrilla group that he
would "regret it" if he did not join them.14 The court concluded
that his position was no different from that of the large group of
young urban males who had been "invited" to join the guerrilla
groups. 42 The court stated that "[u]nfortunately, this country
cannot serve as a safe haven for all of them.' ' 4 3
Both the Elev'enth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit are con-
cerned that the United States could become overwhelmed with
refugees fleeing the brutality of their native countries. They are
concerned that granting political asylum to neutrals will result
in an unmanageable number of asylum applications. However,
refusing to recognize that neutrality is a political opinion is not
the correct way in which to address this issue. The courts can
use other means to ensure that asylum will be extended only to
136. Id.
137. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1299 n.5.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 802 F.2d 1518 (4th Cir. 1986).
141. Id. at 1521.
142. Id. See also Figeroa v. U.S. INS, 886 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1989). In Cruz-Lopez,
the Fourth Circuit declined to decide whether neutrality constitutes an opinion for the
purposes of asylum. 802 F.2d at 1520 n.3. However, the denial of asylum in both Cruz-
Lopez and Figeroa indicates that the Fourth Circuit is not inclined to conclude that
neutrality constitutes a political opinion for asylum purposes.
143. Cruz-Lopez, 802 F.2d at 1521.
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true victims of political persecution, and that the asylum doc-
trine is not abused by undesirables such as Escobar, who are
convicted of felonies, in the United States.
First, it must be remembered that the grant of asylum is a
discretionary function.' Thus, if there are legitimate reasons to
deny asylum in a given case, the judge is not restrained by rigid
rules. Mr. Escobar is a case in point. The circumstances which
led to his departure from El Salvador are useful as a starting
point from which to examine situations in which legitimate po-
litical neutrals may find themselves forced to flee from persecu-
tion in their native countries. In Mr. Escobar's case, it was per-
fectly reasonable to deny him asylum on the basis of his three
felony convictions, especially in light of the fact that he was
granted safe haven in Mexico but decided to illegally enter the
United States. As this reasoning suggests, if there is a good rea-
son to deny asylum in a given case, it can be done without insti-
tuting broadly sweeping doctrines that deny asylum to legiti-
mate refugees merely because they are politically neutral.
Second, the courts can require aliens to demonstrate that
their political opinions of neutrality were articulated in their na-
tive countries. The courts are concerned that many aliens who
are actually "economic" refugees will undermine the purpose of
the asylum doctrine by testifying in the United States that they
are neutral, even though they are not actual victims of persecu-
tion.145 By requiring that the alien's neutrality have been previ-
ously articulated, the courts can ensure that an alien is truly po-
litically neutral and not merely claiming neutrality as a
convenience. The main question, then, is how does one articulate
his or her neutrality so as to gain the benefit of political asylum?
The Articulation Requirement
According to both the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit,
in order to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of a political opinion of neutrality, an alien must
demonstrate that he or she has somehow articulated this opin-
ion. 46 Such articulation helps to satisfy the statutory require-
144. See supra note 3.
145. See supra note 78.
146. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984); Umanzor-Alva-
rado v. INS, 896 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1990); Perlera-Escobar v. EOIR, 894 F.2d 1292 (11th
Cir. 1990).
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ment that persecution be based on political opinion rather than
on a personal conflict between two parties, because the persecu-
tor must know of the victim's political position in order to be
able to persecute him or her for it. 4" The only exception to this
rule occurs where the persecutor imputes an incorrect opinion to
the victim.148
In denying asylum to Mr. Perlera-Escobar, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that even if neutrality1 49 were assumed to consti-
tute an opinion under the Refugee Act, Escobar failed to articu-
late his position of neutrality.5 0 This conclusion fails to recog-
nize that a position of neutrality can be articulated as effectively
by overt acts such as deserting the guerrillas, as by vocal
expression.
While both the Eleventh Circuit and the First Circuit have
indicated that a political opinion must be articulated, 5' neither
court has provided any guidance in determining how an alien
can satisfy this requirement. The Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, has offered a very promising approach to the articulation
requirement. Since its 1985 decision in Bolanos-Hernandez, the
Ninth Circuit also has required aliens to demonstrate that their
position of neutrality was articulated. 52 However, in Bolanos-
Hernandez, the court determined that an alien had articulated
his neutrality by refusing to become affiliated with a particular
political faction.'53 The court stated "[T]hat conduct is as much
an affirmative expression of a political opinion as is joining a
side, or speaking out against a side."'"4
147. The Handbook, supra note 18, at 20 n.82, does not require that an alien's opin-
ion of neutrality be articulated. However, since the Handbook is not a binding authority,
the courts are within their rights in requiring that a political opinion must be articulated
in some way.
148. See infra notes 163-88 and accompanying text.
149. In a confusing use of language, the Eleventh Circuit substituted the words "no
opinion" for the word "neutrality." See Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1298. The two
should not be considered interchangeable since "neutrality" implies that one has consid-
ered the political alternatives and declined to embrace them, whereas "no opinion" im-
plies that one has not considered any of the alternatives.
150. Id.
151. See id; Umanzor-Alvarado v. INS, 896 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1990).
152. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984).
153. Id. at 1325.
154. Id. at 1325-26. The BIA has indicated that it will limit the applicability of
Bolanos-Hernandez to cases arising in the Ninth Circuit, at least in cases where the
alien's opinion of neutrality was expressed during his or her deportation hearing in the
United States. See Brief for Respondent at 33, Perlera-Escobar (No. 89-5064). See also
Matter of Vigil, Int. Dec. 3050 at 6-7 (BIA March 17, 1988).
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Since Bolanos-Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit's position on
articulation has evolved into a belief that overt acts of neutrality
are as effective as spoken words in conveying one's political
opinion of neutrality.15 In developing its standards, the Ninth
Circuit has taken a realistic view of the situations in El Salvador
and similar countries. 5 6 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's posi-
tion provides an example of why the Eleventh Circuit was incor-
rect in concluding that Escobar never articulated his position of
neutrality.
Although Escobar admitted that he never stated he was
neutral while in El Salvador, 57 as the Ninth Circuit has shown,
overt acts can convey a message of neutrality as effectively as
spoken words. Escobar, having been forced to flee from the
death squads, sought refuge from a friend who was a known
guerrilla.15 8 Escobar testified that it was not his intention to join
the guerrillas, but rather he was forced to fight for them.' 59 That
this was an involuntary alliance is manifested in the fact that he
deserted the guerrillas at the first opportunity, despite knowing
that they make a practice of executing deserters.' Thus, by
fleeing both the guerrillas and the death squads, Escobar articu-
lated his desire not to be associated with either group.
Escobar's situation is a common one in a country where
both the guerrillas and the government-backed forces roam the
countryside seeking the support of the civilian population. Both
groups have shown that they are more than willing to resort to
brutality in order to gain this support.' When neutral civilians
155. See, e.g., Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir. 1985) (alien failed to
make an affirmative choice of political neutrality); Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d 1407 (9th
Cir. 1985) (alien's testimony to Immigration Judge of desire to remain neutral and re-
fusal, on several occasions, to join either the guerrillas or the death squads bespoke a
position of neutrality); Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1987) (persecution be-
cause of an overt manifestation of political opinion is persecution because of political
opinion); Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1988) (alien's refusal to volunta-
rily join the guerrillas reflected his non-support for their cause and his adoption of a
neutral position toward both sides in the civil war). For a detailed discussion of the
articulation issue, see von Sternberg, supra note 108, at 36-43.
156. See Bolanos-Hernandez, 749 F.2d at 1325.
157. BIA Decision, supra note 65, at 11.
158. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1294.
159. Id.
160. Even if Escobar had willingly joined the guerrillas, he could subsequently adopt
a position of neutrality and have the right to leave the guerrillas. The guerrillas do not
have a sovereign right to force him to remain and fight for them. See infra notes 179-88
and accompanying text.
161. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1295.
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are approached by either or both parties, and, through their ac-
tions, refuse to become affiliated with those parties, such refusal
articulates their position of neutrality as clearly as any spoken
word.162
VI. IMPUTED POLITICAL OPINION
An alien is entitled to asylum when he or she will be perse-
cuted on account of a political opinion which the persecutor be-
lieves the alien holds, even if the alien actually holds a different
opinion.163 In defining political opinion, the Handbook recog-
nizes that the persecutor may attribute or impute an incorrect
opinion to the alien and use it as a basis for persecution.
6 4
Thus, in determining whether an alien has a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of political opinion, it is important to
look at the alien from the perspective of the persecutor.'"9 Ac-
cording to the Ninth Circuit, "[i]f the persecutor thinks the per-
son guilty of a political opinion, then the person is at risk."M
"
This doctrine is not limited to political neutrals. It applies no
matter what the victim's political opinion is, so long as the per-
secutor incorrectly attributes a certain political opinion to the
victim.
A typical case of imputed opinion is Argueta v. INS.16 7 In
Argueta, a neutral Salvadoran was incorrectly accused by the
government of being involved with the guerrillas.6 8 Argueta was
told that if he did not leave the country immediately he would
disappear, since he had been designated as the "next one." 0 9
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Argueta had a well-founded
fear of persecution based on the incorrect political opinion
which the government imputed to him.'" The decision in
Argueta is representative of the Ninth Circuit's position that
persecution is properly categorized as based on political opinion
when the persecutor attributes certain characteristics to the
162. See supra note 154; Del Valle v. INS, 776 F.2d at 1413-14; see also Argueta v.
INS, 759 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987).
163. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985).
164. Handbook, supra note 18.
165. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
166. Id.
167. 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
168. Id. at 1397.
169. Id.
170. Id. The court also concluded that his decision to remain neutral constituted an
expression of a political opinion. Id.
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victim." 1
The First Circuit has also recognized the dangerous impact
of an imputed political opinion on neutrals. In Novoa-Umania v.
INS, 7 2 the First Circuit stated that a neutral could establish a
well-founded fear of persecution if, among other things, it was
possible to demonstrate that one or more groups intended to
persecute the neutral alien because each (incorrectly) thought he
or she held the political views of the other side. 73
The Eleventh Circuit did not follow this line of reasoning in
Perlera-Escobar. The court did not deny that it is possible for a
person to be a victim of persecution on account of an imputed
political opinion. However, the reasoning used by the court in
Escobar's case indicates that it will be very difficult for unwilling
recruits who desert the guerrillas to prove that their desertion
would be punished for its political motivation. Regarding Esco-
bar, the court conceded that he might have reason to fear repri-
sals upon returning to El Salvador.1 74 However, the court con-
cluded that neither the government nor the guerrillas would
impute a political opinion to Escobar and seek to persecute him
for it.17 According considerable deference to the findings of the
BIA, the court first concluded that the guerrillas' interest in Es-
cobar was based on their need to preserve unity within the
group and to ensure the secrecy of their operations. 7 The court
then determined that any harm perpetrated on Escobar by the
government would be based on the need to punish him for fight-
ing for the rebel guerrillas rather than on his political opinion.177
Both of these conclusions are ill-founded.
Regarding Escobar's fear of the guerrillas, the court failed
to appreciate the guerrilla's primary motivation. The guerrillas
feared that Escobar would reveal secret information about their
operations. It is reasonable to conclude that they feared that the
171. See, e.g., Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985) (when the
government attributes certain political opinions to an alien, persecution is properly rec-
ognized as being based on political opinion); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988)
(alien possessed political opinions because his persecutors attributed political opinions to
him and regarded him as a subversive); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d at 1435 (alien
suffered persecution because of one specific political opinion attributed to her by
persecutor).
172. 896 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
173. Id. at 3. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
174. Perlera-Escobar v. EOIR, 894 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1990).
175. Id. at 1298.
176. Id. at 1298, 1299.
177. Id. at 1299.
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government would be the recipient of those secrets.'78 Thus, the
guerrillas cast Escobar in the role of a government sympathizer
and imputed a false opinion to him.
Further, the Eleventh Circuit erred in relying on the BIA's
position that the guerrillas, as a military unit, can legitimately
punish deserters.179 The BIA has asserted that the guerrillas
have a right to discipline their members in order to ensure cohe-
sion within their units, even to the point of punishing deserters,
just as a sovereign government does. 80 The BIA has concluded
that the motivation of the guerrillas in such instances is apoliti-
cal and is related only to their "para-military" needs.'8' The ba-
sic flaw in this reasoning is that it draws a false analogy between
the legitimate power of the government over its recruits, and the
"para-military" needs of the guerrillas.'82 A legitimate govern-
ment has the basic, legal authority, with some exceptions, 18 3 to
conscript young men and enforce discipline within their ranks. 18 4
Insurgent groups, on the other hand, have no such authority. 8
Indeed, it is fundamental to modern international law that the
police power is an exclusive prerogative of sovereign govern-
ments. 88 Logically then, once a recruit offers resistance to the
guerrillas, he or she ceases to be a willing participant and the
guerrillas have no authority to inflict any discipline or punish-
ment. 8 7 In light of this, an alien's desertion, when politically
motivated, is a manifestation of a political opinion and any re-
prisals from the guerrillas must be viewed as persecution for
that opinion rather than as a necessary incident of their para-
178. Escobar introduced evidence showing how the guerrillas retaliate against those
whom they believe provide information to the government. See Petitioner's Brief-in-
Chief at 24, Perlera-Escobar (No. 89-5064).
179. See von Sternberg, supra note 108, at 28, 29.
180. See Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, Interim Decision 3041 (BIA 1988) at 10; von
Sternberg, supra note 108, at 28 n.126.
181. Perlera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at 1297.
182. von Sternberg, supra note 108, at 29.
183. Id.; see, e.g., Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1990) (pun-.
ishment of conscientious objectors to conscription may amount to persecution if refusal
is based on genuine reasons of conscience).
184. von Sternberg, supra note 108, at 29.
185. von Sternberg, supra note 108, at 29. See also Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227,
1232 (9th Cir. 1988).
186. von Sternberg, supra note 108, at 29.
187. von Sternberg, supra note 108, at 29. "Forced recruitment by a revolutionary
army is tantamount to kidnapping, and is therefore persecution." Arteaga, 836 F.2d at
1232.
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military needs. 188 Thus, when Escobar deserted the guerrillas he
put them on notice of his political opinion of neutrality. Logi-
cally then, any harm perpetrated against him by the guerrillas
would be persecution on account of his political choice rather
than a necessary result of their illegitimate para-military needs.
The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the government
would legitimately seek to punish Escobar as a rebel, rather than
seek to persecute him for an imputed political opinion, is also
incorrect. Escobar testified that he was forcibly recruited by the
guerrillas. His subsequent desertion, despite the documented
perils of such an act, was a demonstration of his desire not to be
associated with the guerrillas. Yet, the death squads continued
to view Escobar as a guerrilla and continued to hunt for him. In
so doing, they imputed an incorrect political opinion to him. If
Escobar had voluntarily fought against the government before
deserting, then they would have a legitimate reason to punish
him. Here, however, Escobar's participation was involuntary.
Thus, any harm inflicted on Escobar would be persecution on
account of an incorrectly imputed political opinion, and not le-
gitimate punishment.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit has made an unfortunate decision in
concluding that neutrality does not constitute a political opinion
for the purposes of political asylum. Furthermore, the Eleventh
Circuit is incorrect in suggesting that the courts are not qualified
to determine what constitutes a political opinion. In light of
Congress' specific inclusion of political opinion in the asylum
statute as well as the presence of judicially manageable stan-
dards and methods for determining what constitutes a political
opinion, the judicial branch is the proper forum in which to de-
cide the political opinion question.
Further, neutrality constitutes a valid political opinion for
individuals who are aware of and have considered their political
choices and who have affirmatively declined to affiliate with one
or more political groups. Although the various circuits have
struggled with this question, the Ninth Circuit has reasonably
concluded that an affirmative and articulated decision to be neu-
tral is political in nature.
188. von Sternberg, supra note 108, at 47.
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By requiring asylum applicants to demonstrate that their
opinion of neutrality was an articulated one, the courts can en-
sure that such applicants are true victims of political persecu-
tion, and not merely claiming political neutrality as a conve-
nience. Further, the courts can use their discretionary powers to
ensure that the asylum process is not abused by undeserving in-
dividuals, such as convicted felons. The courts must be more
willing to recognize that even if a person is not being persecuted
for being neutral per se, that person could be the victim of per-
secution on account of an incorrectly imputed political opinion.
The Ninth Circuit has adopted the most reasonable approach to
the neutrality question. Absent a Supreme Court decision on
neutrality, this standard should be adopted by the other circuits.
The standard set forth by the Ninth Circuit will ensure that le-
gitimate refugees receive asylum. In contrast, the standard set
forth by the Eleventh Circuit in Perlera-Escobar ensures only
that some legitimate refugees will be denied asylum.
William A. Epstein
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